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Talk to just about any Federal 
Reserve economist, and they will tell 
you that at cocktail parties, school 
fundraisers, and whatnot, the question 
they always get asked is “where are 
interest rates going?” Now while the 
Fed economist may have little wisdom 
to impart, it is true that the Federal 
Reserve does target interest rates. The 
rate that the Fed targets, however, the 
federal funds rate, is of direct interest 
only to bankers and other investment 
professionals (who seem over-repre-
sented in certain Cub Scout packs, but 
that’s another story). The rates people 
worry about are the ones that more 
directly affect them—mortgages, auto 
loans, credit cards. 
Of course, the Federal Reserve does 
affect these interest rates, but the con-
nection between the short-term rates 
targeted by the Fed and the longer-
term rates most people worry about is 
complicated and involves some subtle 
factors. It’s generally understood that 
when the Fed changes the federal 
funds rate, other rates in the econ-
omy also change. What’s less appre-
ciated is that the way interest rates 
change depends not just on what the 
Fed does today, or even next month 
or next year, but also on people’s per-
ceptions about the goals and credibil-
ity of the monetary authority. These 
goals and the accompanying expecta-
tions in turn depend on the institutional 
arrangements of monetary policy—
some countries have laws mandating 
low inﬂ  ation, others have a tradition 
of keeping inﬂ  ation low, still others 
have nothing of the kind. This Eco-
nomic Commentary looks at how such 
arrangements inﬂ  uence the impact of 
Federal Reserve actions on the broader 
ﬁ  nancial markets. In a phrase, it looks 
at the impact of monetary regimes.
  Regimes
Probably the best way to think of a 
monetary regime is as a set of institu-
tional arrangements—how monetary 
policy is set up—along with the cor-
responding expectations of the pub-
lic. Thus it’s not just what is called the 
monetary standard, which comprises 
the laws, regulations, and bureaucracy 
governing the money supply, but also 
includes expectations—does the public 
believe the commitment to zero inﬂ  a-
tion, or not?
The concept of a monetary regime is 
quite broad. The situations encom-
passed range from systems where 
money consists of unbacked, rather 
ﬂ  imsy pieces of paper to those where 
people knew the money supply would 
change only if someone sailed to a dis-
tant island and returned with disk hewn 
from solid rock (as was the case on the 
Isle of Yap). Usually though, monetary 
regimes tend to be a variation of two 
(somewhat idealized) types: commod-
ity standards and ﬁ  at systems. 
Commodity standards presuppose that 
money is freely convertible into a com-
modity—usually gold, but silver is also 
common. Under a gold standard, for 
example, the money supply is ﬁ  xed by 
the supply of gold in the world. This 
provides a nominal anchor to the price 
level, effectively preventing long-term 
inﬂ  ation since it ties money to gold. 
Of course, some inﬂ  ation is still pos-
sible in the short run because trans-
port costs, shipping delays, and so on 
mean that money isn’t immediately 
converted into gold, but barring major 
gold discoveries, the inﬂ  ation will dis-
sipate quickly. 
A ﬁ  at regime has no backing for 
money. That is, the government or 
central bank will only exchange your 
paper money for other paper money, 
not gold or silver. (The word ﬁ  at 
comes from the Latin for “let it be 
done,” indicating that the government 
just declares that the paper is money.)
A gold standard is not the only regime 
that will keep inﬂ  ation low. A ﬁ  at 
regime, where money is not backed, 
can still be credible if there is a com-
mitment to low inﬂ  ation. This commit-
ment might be informal, just a consen-
sus of those in charge or the product 
of culture and tradition. The commit-
ment to low inﬂ  ation might be man-
The yield curve has a wealth of 
information about future interest 
rates and economic conditions. 
Users should exercise caution, 
though, as many of the rela-
tionships that hold between the 
behavior of the curve and what it 
fortells depend on the monetary 
regime in place at the time the 
curve is drawn.dated by law, as in Canada, Great Brit-
ain, and New Zealand. Just as in the 
gold standard case, sometimes inﬂ  ation 
will occur, but the central bank acts to 
bring it down. And people expect that 
to happen.
Regimes are not always be credible. 
For example, when the price level 
and money supply are not tied down 
by law or by a gold standard, inﬂ  a-
tion can, and has, gotten out of control. 
Thus the economy, in addition to short-
term inﬂ  ation, may see inﬂ  ation over 
the longer term. People realize that 
inﬂ  ation has increased and is unlikely 
to decrease for quite some time. Nei-
ther the workings of a gold standard or 
the commitment of the central bank are 
in place to force inﬂ  ation back down. 
In some sense, then, a good measure of 
the credibility of a regime is the per-
sistence of inﬂ  ation. In both the gold 
standard and the credible ﬁ  at regime, 
a burst of inﬂ  ation does not last, as 
either the standard or the central bank 
soon gets prices under control. With 
a noncredible ﬁ  at regime, however, 
things are different. Higher inﬂ  a-
tion may last for a long time. What 
was temporary inﬂ  ation in a credible 
regime becomes persistent inﬂ  ation in 
a less credible regime. 
As the reader might have guessed, 
these regimes are not purely imaginary, 
though they may be starker than what 
is actually seen in practice. The United 
States was on some form of a gold 
standard from 1879 until 1933. For 
most of that period inﬂ  ation remained 
low (see ﬁ  gure 1). The major excep-
tion was World War I and its aftermath, 
when inﬂ  ation at times reached nearly 
30 percent. This reﬂ  ected massive gold 
imports from Europeans looking for 
a safe harbor for their assets. Shortly 
after the war, though, as the Europeans 
countries returned to the gold standard, 
prices fell, and it was deﬂ  ation that hit 
double digits in the United States dur-
ing the early 1920s.
After 1933, when Americans could no 
longer exchange their dollars for gold, 
(or even own gold) the United States 
still retained a tenuous link to the gold 
standard in that currency was required 
to have a partial gold backing. The 
government was required to hold a cer-
tain amount of gold for each Federal 
Reserve note issued to the public. This 
requirement was eliminated in 1968. 
After this time, foreign central banks 
could still exchange dollars for gold, 
but even this ended in August of 1971.
At least since 1972, the United States 
has been on a ﬁ  at regime. This has at 
times looked like both the credible and 
the noncredible ﬁ  at regime described 
above. For most of the 1970s, inﬂ  ation 
was high and it persisted at high levels 
for most of the decade. Since the mid-
dle 1980s, however, inﬂ  ation has been 
lower, and its increases only temporary.
   Riding the Yield Curve
The different types of monetary 
regimes embody different patterns of 
action by the central bank and different 
expectations of the public. These pat-
terns strongly color how interest rates 
will move. Understanding the inﬂ  u-
ence of these patterns means taking a 
closer look at different interest rates. 
As mentioned above, there are many 
types of interest rates in the ﬁ  nan-
cial marketplace: Think of mortgages, 
savings bonds, auto loans, and junk 
bonds. There are interest rates on safe 
investments (savings bonds) and risky 
investments (junk bonds), short-term 
rates and long-term rates, rates backed 
by hard collateral (auto loans) and 
those backed by promises to pay. For 
our purposes, though, the most impor-
tant patterns arise when we concentrate 
on different maturities: short versus 
long rates. And to avoid differences in 
risk and so forth, it makes sense to fur-
ther focus on just U.S. Treasury debt, 
which is considered default free. Plot-
ting these rates against their maturity 
produces the yield curve. Understand-
ing how the yield curve moves and 
reacts to different economic events pro-
vides a glimpse into the relationships 
between long- and short-term interest 
rates. For example, short-term inter-
est rates might be quite low, but that 
does not guarantee low long-term rates: 
a steeply sloped yield curve will have 
long rates much higher than short rates.
What does this talk of interest rates 
have to do with regimes? The mon-
etary regime has a lot to do with the 
shape and movement of the yield 
curve, and thus with how closely short 
and long-term rates move together (or 
don’t). 
The ﬁ  rst step in this process is recall-
ing how inﬂ  ation affects interest rates. 
When prices rise, dollars in the future 
buy less than dollars today, so get-
ting 10 percent interest does not buy 
you 10 percent more stuff. The “real” 
return or real yield is less than the 10 
percent because of the value inﬂ  ation 
takes away. Smart investors know this, 
and take account of expected inﬂ  ation 
when making ﬁ  nancial transactions. As 
a result (the famous Fisher equation) 
the nominal interest rate on a bond or 
money market account can be thought 
of as being composed of a real rate and 
an expected inﬂ  ation rate. A 10 percent 
interest rate with no inﬂ  ation gives you 
the same real return as a 15 percent 
interest rate when inﬂ  ation runs at 5 
percent.
This is where regimes, their credibility, 
and the persistence of inﬂ  ation come 
in. Under a credible regime, such as a 
gold standard, inﬂ  ation may be high at 
times, but it is only temporary. Thus, 
shorter-term rates—three months, one 
year, and so forth, should build in that 
inﬂ  ation premium, and increase. Over 
the long haul, however, inﬂ  ation will 
revert to low levels, so there shouldn’t 
be much of an inﬂ  ation premium on 
10-, 20-, or 30-year bonds.
This means that under a credible 
regime, inﬂ  ation shocks end up ﬂ  atten-
ing the yield curve temporarily. (Con-
versely, a shot of deﬂ  ation will make 
the curve steeper.)
Things are different under a less cred-
ible regime, where inﬂ  ation is more 
persistent. Inﬂ  ation hangs around lon-
ger, so that high inﬂ  ation today means 
high inﬂ  ation tomorrow as well. The 
inﬂ  ation premium not only gets built 
in to short rates, but to longer rates as 
well. Unlike the credible case, where 
inﬂ  ation moved up only short-term 
interest rates, in the noncredible case, 
inﬂ  ation moves up long and short 
rates. This shifts the entire yield curve 
up. The curve does not, however, get 
appreciably steeper or ﬂ  atter, as rates 
move up with inﬂ  ation. 
That last point deserves a bit more 
explanation. Whether the curve gets 
steeper or ﬂ  atter depends on how per-
sistent inﬂ  ation is. In one extreme case, 
where higher inﬂ  ation today causes 
people to expect that higher rate for-
ever, the slope does not change. If 
inﬂ  ation is less persistent, the long 
rates won’t rise as much as short rates, 
and the curve will move up and ﬂ  atten, 
though not as much as in the credible SOURCES:  Balke and Gordon (1986); and the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.
FIGURE 1  INFLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
case. It’s even possible that people see 
a small rise in inﬂ  ation today and think 
this presages even more inﬂ  ation, so 
the curve gets steeper.
   Digging in the Data
Now all this matters precisely because 
many people are anxious to extract any 
information they can from the yield 
curve. So the ﬁ  rst set of people who can 
beneﬁ  t from understanding the relation 
between regimes and the yield curve are 
those ﬁ  nancial analysts, market watch-
ers, and homeowners looking to reﬁ  -
nance who are concerned with the rela-
tionship between long and short rates. 
The lesson for them is that the regime 
matters a lot when thinking about the 
connection between long rates and 
short rates. Seeing short rates rise 
today doesn’t always tell you much 
about long rates, and this is particu-
larly true in times of low and stable 
inﬂ  ation. For example, over the past 
decade and a half, 10-year interest 
rates have shown both large increases 
and decreases in response to changes 
in the federal funds rate, the overnight 
rate targeted by the Fed’s Federal Open 
Market Committee. 
Another set of people who should heed 
the message about regimes are those 
who use the yield curve to help fore-
cast the future. This probably includes 
many of those responsible for mon-
etary policy. Because ﬁ  nancial markets 
are by their very nature forward look-
ing, they embody the expectations of 
a great many people, and thus contain 
a lot of information about the future. 
Many people in fact use the slope 
of the yield curve—the difference 
between long and short rates—to fore-
cast economic growth. The idea is that 
an inverted yield curve can signal an 
upcoming recession. More generally, a 
ﬂ  at (or inverted) yield curve presages 
slow growth, with a steep curve pre-
dicting faster economic growth. The 
reasons for this are not entirely clear, 
but in part, this may reﬂ  ect monetary 
policy: A steep yield curve means the 
central bank is keeping short-term 
rates below average, indicating expan-
sionary policy. How reliable this yield 
curve signal is varies over time, how-
ever, and the reliability depends a lot 
on which monetary regime we’re in.
Recall that under a credible nominal 
regime, with a gold standard or inﬂ  a-
tion target, inﬂ  ation, being temporary, 
will increase short rates but leave long 
rates unchanged. Bursts of inﬂ  ation 
then add noise to the signal the yield 
curve is giving—some purely nomi-
nal shifts are added to the movements 
forecasting the real economy. Under a 
credible regime, then, the yield curve 
should have some trouble forecasting 
the real economy.
With a regime that is not credible, 
the situation is different. Since inﬂ  a-
tion is more persistent, it tends to hang 
around for a while, and this drives up 
long-term rates along with short-term 
rates. That is, yields shift up together 
all along the curve, keeping the slope 
roughly constant. That means persistent 
inﬂ  ation does little to change the slope 
of the yield curve, keeping its predictive 
properties intact. So under a noncred-
ible regime the yield curve does better 
in forecasting the real economy. 
The differences in credibility perhaps 
underlie the somewhat murky perfor-
mance of the yield curve in predict-
ing the most recent recessions. In the 
early 1980s, when the credibility of the 
Federal Reserve was not as strong, the 
yield curve gave clear signals of reces-
sions. The recession starting in Janu-
ary 1980 was heralded by an inverted 
yield curve a year earlier, in January 
of 1979, and short rates exceeded long 
rates by almost a full point by Septem-
ber of 1979. Similarly, the recession of 
July 1981 was preceded by an inverted 
yield curve, where short rates exceeded 
long rates by over two and half percent 
in December 1980. 
In contrast, when the Federal Reserve 
had attained greater credibility, predic-
tions from the yield curve were not so 
clear. Prior to the 1990 recession, for 
example, the yield curve did not invert, 
though it did ﬂ  atten considerably. Prior 
to the most recent recession starting 
in March 2001, the curve did invert, 
but short rates exceeded long rates by 
barely half a percentage point, and that 
was in December of 2000, giving little 
lead time.
   Clouds and Silver Linings
The points made about regimes, inﬂ  a-
tion, and yield curves have neglected 
some very important issues. There are 
large advantages to having a regime 
with stable low inﬂ  ation. Firms and 
workers can set contracts without wor-
rying about inﬂ  ation eating away the 
gains. The tax code won’t automati-
cally bump people into higher tax 
brackets even if real incomes don’t 
rise. The post ofﬁ  ce won’t have to keep 
raising the cost of stamps. 
But these advantages come with some 
costs, and one of these costs is a yield 
curve that is more difﬁ  cult to interpret. 
Such a cost hardly justiﬁ  es a return 
to double-digit inﬂ  ation, but it should 
serve as a cautionary reminder that 
some signals and indicators will prove 
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   Notes
1. This Commentary is based on work 
with Michael D Bordo of Rutgers Uni-
versity. A more detailed discussion of 
the ideas can be found in the paper, 
“The Yield Curve, Recession, and the 
Credibility of the Monetary Regime: 
Long-run Evidence, 1875–1997.” Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Work-
ing Paper, no. 04-02, and NBER Work-
ing Paper no. 10431, April 2004.
2. The speciﬁ  c examples of spreads 
and growth use monthly data for the 
spread between 10-year and 3-month 
Treasury securities. Other maturities 
and more frequent data (daily, weekly) 
would be a bit different, (that is, one 
could ﬁ  nd a small, brief inversion prior 
to the 1990 recession) but the basic 
message would be the same.
3. The data for a portion of the inﬂ  a-
tion series used in ﬁ  gure 1 come from 
Nathan S. Balke and Robert J. Gordon. 
1996. “Historical Data,” in appendix 
B of The American Business Cycle: 
Continuity and Change, NBER Studies 
in Business Cycles, vol. 25, edited by 
Robert J. Gordon, University of Chi-
cago Press, Chicago.
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